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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON

____________________________________________________________________________
ISSUE: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE MODES OF INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AS
DEFINED BY ARTICLE 3(1)(A) OF THE STATUTE OF THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON AND
THE MODES AS DEFINED IN THE STATUTES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, THE SPECIAL
COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

ASSERTING THAT THE DIFFERENCES IN LANGUAGE UTILIZED BY THE STATUTES OF
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS TO DENOTE THE MODES OF INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
SERVE A NON-SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL PURPOSE.
____________________________________________________________________________

Prepared by Ashanti C. Lisowitz
J.D. Candidate, May 2012
Spring Semester, 2011
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I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

Question Posed and its Scope*

This memo aims to determine the degree of similarity between the modes of individual
responsibility listed in Article 3(1)(A) of the Statute governing the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon1 (STLst.) and the modes found in the Statutes for the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia,2 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,3 the Special Court
for Sierra Leone4, and the International Criminal Court.5 In furtherance of this goal, this memo
briefly discusses the origins, development, and contemporary treatment of individual liability
for international crimes. Those modes of individual criminal responsibility recognized by past

*

In addition to “committed”, Article 3(1)(a) of the STL Statute provides for other modes of criminal
responsibility, such as “participated as accomplice,” “organized,” or “directed others to commit the
crime.” These terms differ from those referred to in the Statutes of the other international tribunals
(Article 7 of the ICTY Statute, for example, refers to “aided and abetted,” “planned,” “instigated,” and
“ordered”). Does the STL Statute refer to the same modes of criminal responsibility as the other
international tribunals, including the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, and ICC, despite the slight variations in
terminology? Or does Article 3 of the STL Statute refer to different modes of criminal responsibility?
1

Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, appended to S.C. Res. 1753, U.N. S/RES/1757 (May 30,
2007) (hereafter STLst.) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 3].
2

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, appended to S.C.. Res. 808,
U.N. Doc. S/Res./808 (Feb. 22, 1993) (hereinafter ICTYst.) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying
USB flash drive at Source # 4].
3

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, appended to S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/966 (Nov. 8, 1994) (hereinafter ICTRst.) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash
drive at Source # 5].
4

Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, appended to S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc S/1315 (Aug. 14,
2000) (hereinafter SCSLst.) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 6].
5

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by S.C. 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (1998) (hereinafter Rome Statute or ICCst.) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying
USB flash drive at Source # 7].

8

tribunals as within the body of customary international law, and the modes of individual
criminal responsibility enumerated in the STLst. are comparatively analyzed. This discussion
will rely on the Interlocutory Decision of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) Appeals
Chamber and the reasoning used to determine the definition of terrorism applicable to
prosecutions at the STL6 Finally, this memo not only speculates as to the STLst. drafters’
possible motives for using different language for modes of individual criminal responsibility,
but also proffers theories that attempt to explain the significant confusion regarding modes of
individual criminal responsibility.

B.

Summary of Conclusions
1.

Notwithstanding the STLst.’s apparent requirement that the
tribunal apply Lebanese Criminal law, the applicable modes
of individual criminal responsibility are the same modes
found in the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, and ICC statutes.

6

Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration,
Cumulative Charging, Special Tribunal for Lebanon Appeals Chamber, Case No. STL-11-01/I, at ¶¶ 20,
210 (Feb. 16, 2011) (hereinafter Interlocutory Decision) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying
USB flash drive at Source # 22]. Paragraph 210 explains principles that govern the reconciliation of
Article 2 and Article 3, "The Tribunal must reconcile any inconsistencies between Articles 2 and 3 in
light of the general principles of interpretation enunciated above. First, as discussed above regarding the
definition of terrorism, the drafters of the Statute favoured Lebanese law over international criminal law
in terms of substantive crimes, as set out in Article 2. However, [...] Article 2 also includes the proviso
that Lebanese law, including the regulation of criminal participation", should apply "subject to the
provisions of this Statute", and it is clear that the drafters of the Statute intended to incorporate through
Article 3 modes of criminal responsibility recognized in international criminal law. The Appeals
Chamber cannot just assume that Article 3 was a mistake and should not be considered part and parcel
of the Statute. Third, the principle of nullum crimen (in particular, its non-retroactivity requirement)
applies not only to substantive crimes, but also to modes of criminal responsibility."

9

In spite of the fact that Article 2 of the STLst. clearly states that Lebanese criminal law is the
law applicable to the STL,7 this memo will assume that the modes of individual criminal
responsibility in Article 3(1)(A) will be interpreted according to the dictates of customary
international criminal law in all cases except where both of the following statements are true:
first, there is a genuine, substantive difference between Lebanese criminal law and customary
international law; second, the nature of the difference is such that, under Lebanese law, the
rights of the accused will be better protected. In the absence of both conditions, it is reasonable
to conclude that customary modes of individual criminal responsibility are applicable.8

2.

That the modes of individual criminal responsibility enumerated in
Article 3(1)(A) appear to differ from those modes found in the
statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, and ICC can be partially
understood as simultaneously underscoring the unique, hybrid
nature of the STL; facilitating the convergence, consolidation and
refinement of the body of international criminal law; and avoiding
the confusion of trying to apply two systems of law that use terms
very differently.

The STLst. is unique in that it apparently mandates the exclusive application of
domestic law as it pertains to material elements of crimes, criminal participation, and

7

Statute of the STL, Art. 2, supra note 1 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at
Source # 3], states, "The following shall be applicable [...], subject to the provisions of this Statute: The
provisions of the Lebanese Criminal Code relating to the prosecution and punishment of acts of
terrorism, crimes and offences against life and personal integrity, illicit associations and failure to report
crimes and offences, including the rules regarding the material elements of a crime, criminal
participation and conspiracy; and Arts. 6 and 7 of the Lebanese law of 11 January 1958 on 'Increasing
the penalties for sedition, civil war and interfaith struggle.'”
8

Interlocutory Decision, STL, supra note 6, at ¶ 211 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB
flash drive at Source # 22].

10

punishment.9 From a functional, pragmatic standpoint, the use of modes of individual criminal
responsibility that are described with different words but are actually synonymous with the well
established modes of individual criminal responsibility has the effect of emphasizing and
reinforcing the STL’s unique legal character.10 Alone, this reinforcement probably would not
justify the statute’s deviation from the statutory construction established 11 initially in the
Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTYst.)12 and
reaffirmed by the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTRst.),13 the

9

See also, Mark Milonovic, The Oddity that is the Hariri Tribunal, (Sept. 5, 2007), at 1 (unpublished
manuscript [Phd. candidate], on file with Social Sciences Research Network) (where the author
describes the peculiarity of the STL as resulting from the fact that although the intention was for it to be
structurally similar to the other ad hoc, hybrid tribunals, the Statute was enforced by the Security
Council and the authority of the STL is founded on the UN's Article VII power, rather than through a
ratified treaty) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 46].
10

But See Art. 25 Rome Statute, supra note 5 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash
drive at Source # 7], for an example of a different approach. This statute lists variants of the same crime
rather than attempting to delineate modes with specificity. "[F]acilitating the commission of such a
crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists" & "Orders, solicits or induces." Interpretation of Art. 25 could
lead even the strict constructionist to identify numerous opportunities to develop new crimes with the
argument that the language has been incorporated into the statute from its inception. Such a
development has the potential to violate the principal of legality.
11

Establishment here indicates this language was first applied statutorily (or, if you will, codified) in the
ICTYst., and the Statutes for the next two Tribunals (chronologically), the ICTR & SCSL, reinforced
the use of the particular wording.
12

Statute of the ICTY, at Art. 7(1), supra note 2 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash
drive at Source # 4], reads, “A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided
and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the
present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.”
13

Statute of the ICTR, at Art. 6(1), supra note 3 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash
drive at Source # 5], states, "A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided
and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the
present Statute shall be individually responsible for the crime."

11

Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSLst.),14 and the Rome Statute for the
International Criminal Court (ICCst.)15 if no substantive legal differences actually existed.
However, the STLst.’s use of language synonymous with, rather than identical to, customary
modes of individual criminal responsibility actually aids in the classification of legal terms as
variously applied throughout the world.

Finally, the hybrid nature of the STL creates

interesting possibilities for confusion in statutory construction. Because the Lebanese Criminal
Code and customary (and statutory) international criminal law may utilize the same word for
different concepts, it was necessary for the STLst.’s drafters to ensure that, for example, the
Prosecutor is not faced with the impossible task of simultaneously arguing two different
definitions for the same term.

3.

The STL Appeals Chamber, in an Interlocutory Decision, explicitly
states that Article 3 expresses the STLst. drafters’ intent to
incorporate customary modes of individual criminal responsibility.

14

Statute for the SCSL Art. 6(1), supra note 4 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash
drive at Source # 6], says, "A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided
and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the
present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime." (perfectly matching not only the
language of the clause, but also the general statutory structure, of the ICTRst., at least up to Art. 6).
15

The language of Art. 25, Rome Statute for the ICC, is not identical with that of the other subjects of
comparison but has been held to mean those modes of individual criminal responsibility that are
"customary." See Interlocutory Decision, supra note 6, at ¶ 206, 256 [Electronic copy provided in
accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 22] (where the Appeals Chamber argues that the language of
Art. 3 STLst. draws from the ICCst., Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), ICTYst. and
the International Conventions for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, thus, Art. 3 STLst. "reflects the
status of customary international law as articulated in the case law of the ad hoc tribunals; but qualifies
this comparison by noting that the ICCst.'s incorporation of "perpetration by means" is not part of
customary international law).

12

In response to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s inquiry into the applicable definition of
terrorism and proper modes of individual criminal responsibility given the apparent statutory
conflict between Articles 2 and 3, the Appeals Chamber issued an Interlocutory Decision.
There, Judge Cassese identifies the criteria for determining the applicable definition of
terrorism and subsequently indicates this treatment as the model for identifying the proper
modes of individual criminal responsibility. While the drafters of the STLst. clearly favored
application of domestic law, the fact that the STL is an international tribunal cannot be ignored.
Lebanon is a member State of the United Nations and, as a result, is bound by treaty to the
language of the STLst. as interpreted by the Tribunal so authorized.

Additionally, UN

membership helps buttress a general legal principle that, absent explicit language to the
contrary, the laws of nations presumptively satisfy any international obligations of the State,
including the adherence to customary international law.16

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.

Origins, Development and Deployment of the Various Modes of Individual
Criminal Responsibility (or, Where are We and how did We get Here?).

The Office of the Prosecutor for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon has requested
conclusions of law, guided by comparative legal analysis, to determine whether "participated as

16

Interlocutory Decision, supra note 6, at ¶¶ 45-57 (discussing customary international law and its
authority over states), ¶¶ 63-70 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source #
22] (discussing treaty law, its authority and resulting Lebanese obligations). Together these passages
lay down a general framework for the determination of when acknowledgment of an international crime
does not violate legality. Legality then, is the primary focus when any application of international law
to individuals occurs.

13

accomplice," "organized", and "directed others to commit" are the same modes of individual
criminal responsibility found in the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and the ICC, namely,
"committed", "aided and abetted," "planned", "instigated" and "ordered." While this memo
concludes no substantive difference exist between the modes at issue, that conclusion is
premised on the assumption that any substantive difference likely to exist would almost surely
be a result of the conceptual dissonance between the Civil Law tradition and the AngloAmerican, or Common law, tradition.17
Disagreement, uncertainty and complexity are endemic to virtually all systems of law
except perhaps under tyrannical or authoritarian rule. The confusion surrounding the body of
international law on individual criminal responsibility is a multi-faceted problem, recognized
by many international criminal law commentators. 18 The legal dissonance created is a
consequence of attributing criminal liability to individuals for crimes that are largely collective

17

See Kenneth S. Gallant, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
CRIMINAL LAW, at 59 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB
flash drive at Source # 41], for a detailed treatment of the issue of legality in international criminal law.
He argues that the Civil Law tradition creates crimes through analogy and this is problematic in its
violation of nullem crimen. Further, he identifies incidents of "fascist and communist attacks on
legality." For example, the Nazi government passed laws in 1936 & 1938 imposing retroactive death
penalties (at 60).
18

Dr. Kai Ambos, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 5-6, 28 (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman eds.
2000) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 38]; Alison Marston
Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility,
and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75 (2005) at 54 (where the author
notes that the US Racketeering and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is a useful example that typifies
the difficulty of delimiting collective guilt concurrent with the diminishment of personal culpability)
[Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 44]; see also Id. at 11-14
(where the author notes the challenges facing international criminal law in the context of legality and the
difficulty of adherence to this most important principle of modes of criminal responsibility).

14

and systemic. The twentieth century yielded many examples of the ways an organizational
structure can be subverted to criminal ends by even a small minority of ideologically motivated
individuals.19 The objective elements of such criminal action are dispersed across the body
politic, resulting in horrific crimes that often lack clearly culpable actors. As recently as 2002,
one commentator noted there "is still a long way to go towards a comprehensive concept of
individual criminal responsibility." 20 Inquirers into the nature and function of individual
criminal responsibility as it relates to international criminal law must be constantly aware of the
degree to which this difficulty underscores the entire discussion.
Prior to the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR, there was really no cohesive,
systematic understanding of the modes of individual criminal responsibility. The opinions
issued from both tribunals seemed to make a concerted effort to repeatedly re-state the legal
boundaries of "aiding & abetting," "planning," "instigating" and "ordering," as if the implied
intention of the courts was to formally establish these modes of individual criminal
responsibility within the body of international criminal law.21 Being the first international

19

The governments of Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and Pol-Pot are the most notorious, having had more of their
own countrymen to kill than dictators of smaller countries.
20

Ambos, supra note 18, at 28 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source #
38].
21

See Milutinovic et al., Judgment (3 of 4), Case No. IT-05-87-T (Feb. 26, 2009) at ¶¶ 1-1113 (where
the court spends nearly four hundred pages analyzing the criminal responsibility of the defendants, who
were charged under various theories of liability, such as command responsibility and joint criminal
enterprise(JCE)). It is interesting to note that in all the Judgments of the various Tribunals, there was
never a defendant who was charged simply with "JCE" or "command responsibility." The inability of
these "modes" of individual criminal responsibility to alone suffice for a conviction seems to indicate
that perhaps JCE, and command responsibility are not true modes of individual responsibility if they
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tribunal established since the close of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal, there was much work
to be done.22 The differences between the French, Russian, and Anglo-American approaches to
theoretical conception and application of modes of individual criminal liability, to a large
degree, determine the course of development of international modes of individual
responsibility. As the discussion of international criminal law's development in the post war
tribunals unfolds, the need for clear concepts of criminal culpability becomes evident.

B.

Actus Reus, The Objective Criterion of Criminal Liability in International
Criminal Tribunals

The Nuremberg Military Tribunal's (NMT) application of what might best be described
as the holographic theory of liability had the apparent effect of decreasing the threshold
required for satisfaction of the objective and subjective elements of crimes. The Charter of the
International Military Tribunal (IMTch.) classified all offenses enumerated therein either as
war crimes, crimes against humanity, or crimes against peace. The language of the IMTch., at

require the addition of the "more traditional" modes that are the focus of this memo. It might be useful
to consider them modes of participation, with the caveat that in much of the literature the term "mode of
responsibility" and "mode of participation” are used synonymously. As applied, they assume the role of
a judicially developed way of arguing similarity by analogy. Briefly, there are crimes with mode of
individual criminal responsibility that define an actor's culpable relation to the crime. There must be a
way of arguing analogically, that while the accused's relation to the crime does not satisfy the letter of
the modes of responsibility, there is an essential similarity that must be explored; hence, modes of
participation are developed for just such a purpose. See also Milutinovic et at., Judgment (1 of 4), at
¶¶ 75-93 (where the court defines the various elements of planning, ordering, instigation and aiding and
abetting in encyclopedic fashion. [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source
# 31].
22

Mark Ellis, Achieving Justice before the International War Crimes Tribunal: Challenges for the
Defense Counsel, 7 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l. L. 519 (1997) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying
USB flash drive at Source # 45].
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Article (II)(a) states that for purposes of establishing individual criminal responsibility, the
accused is guilty of a crime against peace for "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a
war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment" of war crimes or crimes
against humanity.23 The language of the statute seems to imply no distinction between liability
attributed to direct and indirect actors. Indeed, in practice there was little, if any, distinction
made between principle perpetrators and accessories.24 In U.S.A. v. Pohl et al., the NMT,
furthering interpretation of the Charter of the IMT along this line, based determination of
individual guilt on a sort of aggregate action theory where acts not themselves severe enough to
incur liability were further analyzed in the context of the organizational structure of the German
government or of the Nazi party. The judgment states the following:
The actual execution of the plan in the field involves the operation of another, or
it may be several other persons or groups. Marshaling and distributing the loot,
or allocating the victims, is another phase of the operation which may be
entrusted to an individual or a group far removed from the original planners […]
the acts of any one [...], within the scope of the over-all plan, become the acts of
all the others.25

23

Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), annexed to Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 2].
24

Ambos, supra note 18, at 8 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source #
38].
25

U.S.A. v. Pohl et al., (case 4), in TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS (TWC) BEFORE NUREMBURG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, vols. I-XV, at vol. V, 201-7 (US-GPO,
1950-1953) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 42].
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The Israeli Supreme Court (ISC), in Eichmann, noted that the crime supporting the charges was
so complicatedly vast, involving the participation of many individuals at varying "levels of
control and by differ[ing] modes of activity [among] the planners, the organizers and the
executants." The Court further argued that in such a case application of the traditional concepts
of participation leads to antinomies of legal analysis such as designation of the aider and
principle in a situation where one hunts Jews down for deportation to camps that are designed
to facilitate their deaths rather than actively kill.26 Is the camp guard aiding the one who
deports, or vice versa? The result of this analysis was the conviction of Eichmann, under a
theory of organizational responsibility, as a principle perpetrator for various acts of cooperation and support on the basis that he knew of the plan to exterminate the Jews, thus
satisfying the dolus eventualis,27 or constructive intent standard.
While the language of Article 6 of the IMT Statute appears to provide for an expansive
reading of criminal liability with regard to conspiracy, the German defense counsel were
vehemently opposed to the American conception of conspiracy as "a mere agreement" with no
further requirement of an act in furtherance of the crime. Commentator Joseph Brunner states:
The major objection to the decisions and sentences of the IMT concerns the application
and interpretation of the charge of conspiracy. Introduced in the formulation of
American policy, [...] the charge of conspiracy accused the defendants of planning to

26

Ambos, supra note 18, at 18 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source #
38], quoting Eichmann, Jerusalem District Court, (Dec. 12, 1961), 36 ILR.
27

Id. The definition of this term "dolus eventualis" may warrant its own study. Definitions range from
'general intent' to negligence.' See Cassese, T HE O XFORD C OMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL
C RIMINAL J USTICE, at 302, (Oxford 2009) (for an extended discussion of the concept) [Electronic
copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 40].
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wage aggressive war. This charge was the foundation for declaring Nazi organizations
criminal and the subsequent Law No. 10 trials. This distinctly American tactic was the
base of the American prosecution’s case, and was intended to be widely interpreted by
the judges of the IMT in sentencing. However, the final judgment of the IMT severely
restricted the application of the charge of conspiracy,28

Regarding the criminal act, the NMT held that due to the nature of Nazi crimes, when an
accused has knowledge of the general intent of the Nazi regime, any level of co-operation is
sufficient to produce criminal liability. US jurists advance theories of individual criminal
responsibility that closely resembled what the British called common purpose at the
Nuremburg Tribunals. The tribunal established the basic principle that individuals who violate
international laws can be liable held accountable for their crimes. Other legal doctrines that
were more or less established through the judgments of the NMT include many of the elements
that have been subsequently codified into the statutes of the various international tribunals,
including the following principles:
(a) A treaty's silence regarding enforcement and implementation of itself, does not
preclude a court otherwise statutorily authorized from prosecuting the accused. (b)
That the accused is a head of state or possesses similar authority, or that he was a
subordinate merely following orders is not an excuse, affirmative defense or mitigation
factor. (c) Every accused has the right to a fair trial bound by the facts and the law. (d)
The principles Nullum crimen sine lege and Nulla poena sine lege.29
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Joseph Brunner, American Involvement in the Nuremburg War Crimes Trial Process, MICH. J. HIST.,
at 3 (Winter 2002) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 43].
29

See Ambos, supra at note 18 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source #
38]. These principles represent a distillation of generalities gleaned from an article, the structure of
which seems to parallel the difficulty of systematically approaching the subject of modes of individual
criminal responsibility.
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In dealing with issues of individual criminal responsibility for mass crimes, the basis for
allocating culpability is often derived from the situational authority inherent to chains of
command. In Pohl et al., the notion of command responsibility was invoked at the NMT when
American prosecutors cited US Supreme Court Case Yamashita, arguing:
The law of war imposes on a military officer in a position of command an
affirmative duty to take such steps as are within his power and appropriate to the
circumstances to control those under his command for the prevention of acts
which are violations of the laws of war.30
In general, the IMT and other tribunals required defendants to be leaders involved with the
planning of the crimes, or a member of the policy making group within the government. The
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) would extend command responsibility
jurisdiction to civilians in the context of non-military personnel and the treatment of prisoners
of war.31 As the US jurists are engaged in the above activity at the NMT, alternative lines of
international jurisprudence are pursued at the other tribunals.

The British, at the United

Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) trials, were developing a nuanced theory of coperpetration that sought substantive distinctions between conspiracy, common design, and
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US v. Pohl et al, NMT (case 4), Judgment, in V TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, vols. I-XV (US-GPO
1950-1953) (hereinafter TWC) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source #
32].
31

International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Judgment Tokyo Trials, at 29-30, (Nov. 1, 1948)
(English translation; Availible at http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/IMTFE/index.html#index; last
accessed 4/18/2011) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 23].
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membership in a criminal organization, which seems to be an embryonic formulation of joint
criminal enterprise doctrine.32

C.

Mens Rea, The Subject Requirements for Individual Responsibility

Generally, the defendant accused of a crime is required to have knowledge of the crime,
but in post WW II practice this standard often devolved to an imputed knowledge when certain
objective standards were satisfied. In the Justice trial at the NMT, the court held that, the
requirement of knowledge notwithstanding, some acts are criminal per se and one who
voluntarily aids the Nazi plan cannot claim ignorance as to the criminality involved. 33
Similarly, in U.S.A. v. Krauch & Others (IG Farben), the court states, "that the defendants must
have known" of the aggressive military intentions of the Nazis and further argues that had they
been military experts, the mere fact they knew that various munitions were being produced
throughout Germany would suffice to impute knowledge as to their complicity in the crime of
aggression. 34 The tribunal administrated by the French occupation forces, or Cour de
Cassation, while requiring knowledge of the plan and a specific intent as to its completion to
incur liability for participation or complicity in crimes against humanity, the court, in Touvier,
determined the accused to have the specific intent required due to his having been instigated by
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See Ambose, supra note 18, at 13 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at
Source # 18].
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U.S.A. v. Alstoetter & Others (Justice trial) (case 3), in III TWC, supra note 30, at 1111, (1950-1953)
[Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 14].
34

US v. Krauch and Others (case 6), in VIII TWC, supra note 30, at 1113 [Electronic copy provided in
accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 42].
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a Gestapo official. The NMT developed a distinction between specific and general intent,
grounded in US law, when it stated that "general criminal intent is sufficient in all cases" where
a specified intent is not required explicitly by law. Perhaps, no tribunal went further that the
IMTFE in deconstructing criminal law's general principle that liability can only attach to
intentional acts, intention usually requiring knowledge in at least some capacity. Defendants
were held to have the requisite intent where their mens rea was arguably negligent, not with
regard to the crime itself, but as to the acquisition of the knowledge, because, as the court
noted, "They are at fault in having failed to acquire such knowledge."35
The imputation of knowledge is highly problematic in that it destroys for the accused
the possibility of a blameless mistake as to his ascertainment of the morality of his actions or
associations. It also has the effect of removing any subjectivity from the analysis altogether. If
the accused's mental state is determined by what amounts to the 'reasonable person standard'
found in US law, where is the subjectivity? This problem exists to a much lessor degree with
regard to dolus eventualis, a form of subjective knowledge of the criminality of a possible
result of the actors own action paired with a general awareness regarding the possibility of
criminal results. It contains a bifurcated mens rea assessment that includes the requirement of
knowledge, but the object of this knowledge is not the certainty a crime will result from his
actions, but the knowledge of a 'substantial risk' of said crime's occurrence.

In this regard,

dolus eventualis is likely to be situated between knowledge and recklessness on a mens rea
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Tokyo Judgment, supra note 31 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at
Source # 23].

22

continuum. The specter of ambiguous mental states are just one of the problematic issues that
the later tribunals have sought to remedy.
The ICTY has, among other important things, rejected all presumptions of knowledge.36
While the above discussion is not nearly a complete treatment of the origins of modes of
individual criminal responsibility, it does provide a context useful in the analysis of current
terminology denoting individual criminal participation and responsibility.

III.

Legal Discussion
A.

Modes of Individual Criminal Responsibility Recognized by Customary
International Law as Applied by the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and the ICC.
1.

"Aiding and Abetting"

As formulated by the Appeals Chambers of the ICTY, aiding and abetting always
creates an accessory - principal relation between the accused and the perpetrator. The aider or
abettor needs no knowledge of the accused or the underlying crime. In contrast with common
design, it is never necessary to prove the existence of an organization or a plan. The actor's acts
are "specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a
certain specific crime [...] and this support has a substantial effect upon the perpetration of the
crime." The mental state required is knowledge that the accused's own action assists in the
commission of a crime.37
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See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-T, Judgment, at ¶¶ 663-669, (May 7, 1997) [Electronic
copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 37].
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As formulated here, the international definition of aiding and abetting seems congruent
with the way the Lebanese Criminal Code (LCC) treats the subject. Art. 219 LCC enumerates
the ways one incurs accomplice liability and included is anyone who "aids and abets the
perpetrator" in preparatory acts on the crime.38 Furthermore, the aider whose acts are necessary
to the commission of the crime is treated as a co-perpetrator by specifying the same punishment
for him and the principal.

For an aider whose actions are not causative, a reduction in

culpability is evidenced by the reduction of his sentence in relation to the punishment of the
principal. So, Lebanese criminal law is in agreement with the Appeals Chamber (AC) of the
ICTY, considering aiding and abetting to be a form of accomplice liability, and the STLst. lists
participation as an accomplice as a mode of individual criminal responsibility. This tends to
support the supposition that 'participating as an accomplice' was intended, at the very least, to
contain the international conception of aiding and abetting. The rationale for this contention is
derived from the fact that the STLst.'s drafters purposely juxtaposed Articles 2 & 3, requiring
both (1) the application of domestic law for criminal elements and modes of responsibility and
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Prosecutor v. Popovich et al., Case No. IT-05-88-T, Judgment, at ¶¶ 1014-5, 1019 (June 10, 2010)
[Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 33] (where the court notes that
an omission can serve as the act when proving aiding and abetting).
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Subsection 3, Article 219 Lebanese Criminal Code, (selected sections provided by www.stl-tsl.org).
Accomplice liability is defined as follows: "1. Anyone who issues instructions for its commission, even
if such instructions did not facilitate the act; 2. Anyone who hardens the perpetrator's resolve by any
means; 3. Anyone who, for material or moral gain, accepts the perpetrator's proposal to commit the
offence; 4. Anyone who aids or abets the perpetrator in acts that are preparatory to the offence. 5.
Anyone who, having so agreed with the perpetrator or an accomplice before commission of the offence,
helped to eliminate the traces, to conceal or dispose of items resulting therefrom, or to shield one or
more of the participants from justice; 6. Anyone who, having knowledge of the criminal conduct of
offenders responsible for highway robbery or acts of violence against state security, public safety,
persons or property, provides them with food, shelter, a refuge or a meeting place." (emphasis added,
original format discarded) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 8].
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(2) the acknowledgement that use of modes of individual criminal responsibility may or may
not differ from these explicated by the ICTY and ICTR.

Legal principles of statutory

construction include assuming that the drafters intended that the statute be logically consistent.
Art. 25(3)(c) of the ICCst. defines aiding and abetting more narrowly and appears to
require that a crime, completed or inchoate, be the basis for accessory liability under aiding and
abetting. The ICTY and ICTR statutes do not require that an actual crime occur, but only that
the accused have knowledge of a substantial likelihood that his assistance would result in the
commission of some crime that violates international law. Viewed from the perspective of
Anglo-American law, this standard is vague in its combination of knowledge and substantial
likelihood. This standard is likely the modified intent required where specific intention is not
required, or dolus eventualis, which is called 'advertent recklessness.' In certain instances it is
also possible to be liable as an aider for an omission. The ICTR held in Akayesu, that the
defendant's mere presence at the location a crime was committed satisfied the conduct
requirement. As a public official, he had a duty to oppose the unlawful acts and his omission
served as tacit approval of the acts.39 The ICTYst. and the ICTRst. do not mention a mental
state applicable to aiding and abetting. In contrast, the ICCst. requires an aider to act with
purpose, or specific intent, as to the commission of an underlying crime.
The STLst. appears to substitute the phrase, "participated as accomplice" where the
Statutes for the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, and ICC employ "aiding and abetting." In order to
approach this memo's issue logically, one must concede that outright comparison is impossible
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Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, at ¶ 704, (Sept. 2, 1998) [Electronic copy
provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 13].
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if the modes of individual criminal responsibility enumerated in the STLst. are not to be found
in any other judicially interpreted instrument. At best, an abstract hypothetical comparative
analysis might be feasible, but the construction of that thought experiment would, to a far
greater extent than reality, determine the conclusions. What may be asserted is the following:
(1) it is a matter of common sense, not just common legal sense, that aiding and abetting is a
subspecies of accomplice liability,

(2) the qualities of a subspecies are always entirely

contained within the genus to which it conceptually belongs, (3) the genus will have
characteristics that any one of its species will not have, and (4) the logical conclusion is that the
scope of "participation as an accomplice" is more expansive, and inclusive of more types of
criminal conduct than "aiding and abetting." Defining what types of conduct incur individual
criminal liability, Article 25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute reads, "For the purpose of facilitating the
commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted
commission, including providing the means for its commission."40 This language seems to
explicitly include supplements to traditional notions of aiding and abetting, and create a
category of modes of individual criminal responsibility one might denote "assisting," in which,
aiding and abetting is included. At least with regard to accomplice liability, the STLst. appears
to have harmonized this mode of individual liability. The STLst.'s expansion of a category of
liability begs the following question: How can the STLst. create more liability in the context of
aiding and abetting and not violate nulla poena sine lege?
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Rome Statute of the ICC, at Article 25(3)(c), supra note 5 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying
USB flash drive at Source # 7].
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Prior to the drafting of the STLst., one could argue, there were essentially two distinct
regimes of international law: (1) the system established by the Rome Statute for the ICC, the
world's only permanent international criminal court, that through Article 25 explicates a
nuanced and systematized framework for individual liability; and (2) an ad hoc system
commenced through the ICTYst., and subsequently developed by the ICTR and SCSL, that
clearly identified four modes of international criminal liability and only through analogical
statutory interpretation concluded that, perhaps, certain conduct not explicitly referenced may
also incur liability. The Rome Statue for the ICC embodies the principals of the Continental or
Civil Law tradition with its extensive codification and attempts to allocate culpability ab initio.
Law Professor at Berlin's Humboldt University, Gerhard Werle, in analyzing Article 25 of the
ICCst., notes the supplementation of the customary four modes of criminal responsibility and
further, the apparent systemization of them. He argues that Article 25 ICCst. 'ranks' modes of
participation through its structure.

"Committing" is the highest level of liability, then

"ordering" and "instigating", followed by "assisting", and concluding with "participation in a
group with a common plan."41 Professor Werle seems to think this a great development for
international criminal law,42 but there are good reasons to disagree. For example, the Head of
State who usurps the power of the government to commit genocide, most would agree, is more

41

Gerhard Werle, Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute, at 956-7, J. Int'l Crim.
Just. 5 (2007), 953-975 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 48].
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As noted above, an ab initio, or to use a Kantian term that resonates well in the Civil Law tradition, an
a priori allocation of blameworthiness is foolhardy when one considers that often with international
crimes the most culpable actor is he who is proximally and temporally furthest from the crime.
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blameworthy than those who do the actual killing.43 What the STLst., in its expansion of the
language used to denote modes of individual criminal responsibility, may indicate is the
attempted merging of the two lines of international criminal jurisprudence identified at the this
paragraph's beginning.
The above digression into comparative legal analysis will be further developed below,
but not to the detriment of this memo’s purpose. The next mode of individual responsibility is
“planning, ” the analysis of which poses interesting questions as to the conceptual cohesion of
the current system of international criminal individual responsibility.
2.

"Planning"

"Planning" implies that one or several persons contemplate designing the commission of
a crime at both the preparatory and execution phases. Proof of the existence of a plan may be
provided by circumstantial evidence. Responsibility is incurred when the level of the accused’s
participation is substantial, even when the crime is actually committed by another person."44
The accused satisfies both mental and conduct requirements of planning when his intentional
actions, alone or with another, during the preparatory stages of a crime ultimately committed,
are engaged in with the purpose of facilitating the commission of an international crime.45
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See Eichmann, Jerusalem District Court, supra note 28 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying
USB flash drive at Source # 19] (where the court, discussing the counter intuitive nature of massive,
systemic crimes, notes, "On the contrary, the degree of responsibility generally increases as we draw
further away from the man who uses the fatal instrument with his own hands [...].").
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Prosecutor v. Brima et al, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T, Judgment, at ¶ 765, June 20, 2007 [Electronic
copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 18].
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In his book, International Criminal Law, J. Cassese defines "planning" as "devising,
agreeing upon with others, preparing, and arranging for the commission of a crime."46 The
major issue with regard to responsibility for planning is whether or not the underlying crime
must occur for planning responsibility to attach to the accused. In Akayesu, the ICTR Trial
Chamber took the position that the language of its Statute implies a crime must occur for
planning to be a punishable offense.47 The ICTY has disagreed in Kordic and Cerkez, stating:
The Trial Chamber finds that planning constitutes a discrete form of
responsibility under Article 7(1) of the Statute, and thus agrees that an accused
may be held criminally responsible for planning alone. However, a person found
to have committed a crime will not be found responsible for planning the same
crime. Moreover, an accused will only be held responsible for planning,
instigating or ordering a crime if he directly or indirectly intended that the crime
be committed.48
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Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, supra note 39, at ¶ 480 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB
flash drive at Source # 13]; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, March 3, 2000, at ¶
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J. Cassese argues that planning should be treated as a discrete crime only when the crime
involved is "serious or large-scale," such as, for the planning of mass killings, genocide, or
crimes against humanity.49 This line of reasoning, where the charge of conspiracy is applicable
only where the crime is of such a gravity as to necessitate an added level of protection, is
contrary to the plain meaning of Article II(1)(a), Control Council Law No. 10, which reads as
follows:
Crimes against Peace. Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression
in violation of international laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning,
preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war of violation of
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.50

At Nuremburg the phrase “agreements or assurances” was interpreted to mean conspiracy was
only applicable to the least severe category of international crimes, those against peace. This
was subsequently refuted by the ICTY, Judge Cassese on the bench.51
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See Cassese, supra note 46, at 192 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at
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J. Cassese, arguing the CCL No. 10 application of conspiracy to the crimes classified
least blameworthy is actually backwards, writes the following:
Although there is no consistent case law on this matter, it would seem that the gravity
of international crimes (or at least of the most serious among them) may warrant the
conclusion that planning the commission […] of such crimes is punishable per se even
if the crime is not actually perpetrated. The rationale is that international criminal law
aims not only to punish persons found guilty of crimes, but also to prevent persons from
engaging in serious criminal conduct. Consequently, in case of doubt, criminal rules
must be interpreted as being designed as far as possible to prevent offences. It is
warranted to infer that planning an international crime is punishable is also punishable
per se as a distinct form of criminal liability. [...]”52

In the only STL Interlocutory Decision to date, J. Cassese asserts the proposition that
"terrorism" is a crime under customary international law. Furthermore, because the customary
international crime of terrorism requires specific intent, application of ‘joint criminal enterprise
III” to a charge of terrorism should be precluded.53
Pulling together the threads laid out above, it seems that the STL could confirm
convictions for “planning terrorism,” assuming terrorism is an international crime of such
magnitude that its very planning is sufficient for an individual to incur liability. The next mode
of individual criminal responsibility discussed is “instigating.”

Nuremberg or Tokyo Tribunals, let alone by cases brought before national courts adjudicating
international crimes. Similarly, the Tribunal cannot rely on a set of cases, let alone on a single precedent,
as sufficient to establish a principle of law: the authority of precedents (auctoritas rerum similiter
judicatarum) can only consist in evincing the possible existence of an international rule."
52

Cassese, supra note 46, at 192 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source
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nomenclature used, as the STLst. refers to "organizing" and not "planning."
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3.

"Instigating"

“Instigation” and “incitement” are often used interchangeably, but when incitement is
charged with genocide, it loses the status of a mode of individual criminal responsibility and
becomes part of a crime that does not necessitate its completion before liability may attach.54
When genocide is not the crime upon which a charge is brought, “instigation,” “inducement,”
“urging,” “promoting,” “encouragement” or “persuasion” can all be used to describe the
culpable acts required to prove “incitement”.55
To secure conviction for “instigation”, the Prosecutor must show that the accused
prompted another to commit a crime with the intent regarding the crime's commission. In
Blaskic, the ICTY Trial Chamber asserted that omissions could also constitute the criminal
act.56 Incitement only applies where it is direct and explicit and followed by the crime's
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See Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, supra note 39, at ¶¶ 561, et seq.; Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTY97-32-I, at ¶ 16, Judgment, June 1, 2000 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at
Source # 34].
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See Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, at ¶ 381, Judgment, May 15, 2003 [Electronic copy provided
in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 36]; Prosecutor v. Kristic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, at ¶ 601,
Judgment, Aug. 2, 2001 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 28];
Blaskic, supra note 45, at ¶ 280 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source
# 16]; Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, at ¶ 30, Judgment, June 7, 2001 [Electronic
copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 15]; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No.
ICTR-96-3, at ¶ 38, Judgment, 6 December 1999 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash
drive at Source # 35]; and Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, supra note 39, at ¶ 482 [Electronic copy provided in
accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 13].
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Blaskic, IT-95-14-T, infra note 45, at ¶ 270 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash
drive at Source # 16].
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commission. While this would seem to imply that knowledge is the requisite mental state, if
the accused was aware of the likelihood that his actions would result in the commission of a
crime, this suffices to satisfy the mental element.

There is one major exception to the

application of incitement, and that exception is incitement to genocide, which does not require
completion for liability to attach. This exception may well provide a foundation for arguing
that incitement to terrorism should be a criminal offence even when the terrorist act never
occurs. Terrorism, like genocide, is aimed at the populace at large; therefore, the international
community has a compelling interest in deterring terrorism. Additionally, as intimated above,
this line of reasoning could help buttress a “planning terrorism” conviction.

4.

"Ordering"

Linguistic usage of the terms defining individual criminal responsibility is important to
the inquiry into why the Statute for the STL would, it seems, confuse the international legal
community by changing the lexicon. "Ordering" is a word used in a variety of different ways
within the context of international criminal law. Ordering is a key element of the defense, or
more correctly, the mitigation of "superior orders" charges.57 In the ICCst. ”ordering” is an
element of both "denying quarter" and "displacing civilians". Finally, ordering is a mode of
individual criminal responsibility.
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See Rome Statute for ICC, at Art. 33, supra note 5 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB
flash drive at Source # 7]; Statute for ICTY, at Art. 7(4), supra note 2 [Electronic copy provided in
accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 4].
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In Blaskic, the ICTY Appeals Chamber discussed in depth, the mental state required to
prove ordering. The question at appeal was whether the lower mental standard, of "awareness
of a substantial risk," is sufficient for conviction, or does a more specific intent need to be
shown.

The response of the Appeals Chamber was that any person who possesses the

awareness of such risk must have accepted the crime.

However, they found that the

Prosecution had not proven that even that level of awareness existed and the Judgment of the
Trial Chamber was vacated.58
The objective criterion for showing the accused “ordered” is multifaceted, comprised of
three aspects. The first determination must be whether the accused is even capable of giving an
order. Next, the definition of an order must be applied to the facts of the case to determine if
there was an order. Finally, the specific nature of the relationship between the accused and the
crime supporting the charge must be determined. The Trial Chambers in Blaskic never reached
the first issue due to the accused status as an active duty military officer. By definition this is a
position in which orders are not only possible, but also expected.59 In Kamuhanda, the ICTR
did address this question and determined that ordering implies authority but that authority need
not affect total control.60 Unfortunately, this opinion devolved into circular reasoning when,
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Blaskic, Judgment, IT-95-14-T, supra note 45, at ¶¶ 344-348, 442-444, 455, 465-466(for an extensive
discussion of ordering), at ¶ 42 (where the tribunal says that one who acts with knowledge of a
substantial risk accepts the results of his acts) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash
drive at Source # 16].
59

Id., at ¶¶ 569, 612.

60

Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-95-54A-T, Judgment, at ¶¶ 569, 612, January 22, 2004
[Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 25].
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searching for the accused's authority, the decision was finally based on the fact that he gave an
order. The Kamuhanda Appeals Chamber found another element necessary to prove ordering:
Proof must be offered to show the order is linked in a "but-for" manner of causation, but found
no requirement that the order be formal and further asserted that an order may be proved
circumstantially.61 This last remark might mean that an order can exist in the form of an
omission, as if an omission is obliged by duty, inaction is the actus reaus. This possibility was
summarily disposed of when, in Galic, the Appeals Chamber admitted that absent the existence
of some prior affirmative act, there was not a conceivable scenario in which an omission would
satisfy the actus reus of ordering.62 However, where there is a duty to act, omission is an
action under the law. Perhaps the issue should be treated in more mechanistic terms: the order
given is a force, the results of which, the "owner" of the order must also possess. If the actus
reus is truly an objective standard, then the only consideration relevant is: does the accused
possess the force, which is the cause of the crime?63 Of course, logically, it would be absurd to
attempt mental analysis before the determination of the cause of harm is made, as practically
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Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-A, Judgment, at ¶ 76, Sept. 19, 2005 [Electronic
copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 24].
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Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgment, at ¶ 176, Nov. 30, 2006 [Electronic copy
provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 21].
63

From the standpoint of perfect analytical objectivity, the only aspect of the actor open to analysis is of
his ownership of the force purported to have caused the criminal harm. The objective legal analysis, if
conducted properly, should be a mechanistic investigation into whether {x} force causes {y} result. If
yes, then proceed to an analysis of the qualitative aspects of the source, but it should be noted that any
other inquiry exists properly in the realm of mental analysis.
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speaking, pure objectivity would be virtually rendered impossible at worst and legally defective
at best.

5.

"Commission"

While seeming to be a fairly straight forward mode of liability, commission is treated
last due the fact that the interpretation given to this word by the ICTY includes the doctrine of
joint criminal enterprise.64 The Statue for the ICTY, while containing the identical language of
STLst. Art. 3(1)(a), did not contain any language such as the following from Art. 3(1)(b)
STLst.:
A person shall be individually responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Special Tribunal if that person: Contributed in any other way to the commission of the
crime set forth in article 2 of this Statute by a group of persons acting with a common
purpose, where such contribution is intentional and is either made with the aim of
furthering the general criminal activity or purpose of the group or in the knowledge of
the intention of the group to commit the crime.
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Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case no. IT-00-39-A, Judgment, March 17, 2009, separate opinion, at ¶11, pg
238 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 27]. Judge Shahabuddeen
agues the subtle distinction between JCE having already existed within the concept "committing" and
not as the main decision characterizes it, as an "additional" mode of liability. This perhaps indicates an
awareness of the Tribunal's risk of violating legality. The argument the present writer makes below,
apparently supporting this rationale, is actually presented in the context of whether JCE or perpetration
by means is a more theoretically sound approach to the allocation of guilt to indirect participants. This
by no means implies any agreement with the methodology used. For, if the expression of a laws raison
d'etre requires abstract analysis how can the law not violate legality when imputing notice of a crime so
surreptitiously conceived? That this authors analysis may or may not adequately address the numerous
philosophical and ethical implications, is hardly the point. What is at issue is that the first expression of
JCE came from a Tribunal that declared that imputation of knowledge is in violation of legality and then
performed such imputation, not as to the accused's knowledge, but as the knowledge of the World,
reasoning that if Law Professors and International Jurists are capable of intuiting JCE from "committed"
then the population of the planet is considered as if they knew at the time of the criminal act what the
Tribunal only just explicates at trial.
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The conformation of the applicability of JCE as a mode of individual criminal liability is twofold. First, is simply a confirmation that the jurisprudence regarding joint criminal enterprise
was largely acceptable to the international criminal legal community. Second, and perhaps
more telling is that Article 3(1)(b) may represent the coalescence of the two tracks of
international criminal legal development, it being a move towards codification and away from
analogical legal analysis.
B.

The Tribunals and Other Defining International Instruments: Individual
Criminal Responsibility

Establishment of the ICTY in 1993, through UN Security Council Resolution 808, had a
profound impact on the development of key aspects of ICL. This ad hoc tribunal was the first
to have been authorized by the UN and the first international tribunal since the close of the
Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals.

Created to address reports of atrocities in Bosnia and

Herzegovina the decisions have been instrumental in the application and refinement of
international legal principles.

The Tadic AC Judgment, in particular, broke ground by

sustaining the conviction of the first individual to be charged and convicted for crimes
committed during a domestic conflict. 65 The decision asserted that the doctrine of joint
criminal enterprise (JCE) was implicitly incorporated into the ICTYst., which states, with
regard to modes of individual criminal responsibility, the following:

65

Tadic, IT-94-I-T, supra note 36 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at
Source # 37].
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Article 7
Individual criminal responsibility
A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in
the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the
66
present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.

The most fascinating aspect of the Tadic Judgment is not its result, but rather, how it was
achieved. After a lengthy survey of the jurisprudence employed to deal with issues of so called
indirect participation the AC interpreted the phrase "committed or otherwise aided and abetted"
as implicitly incorporating the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise. Admittedly, this is difficult
to accept at first glance, however, jurists are not, or at least ought not, be in the habit of treating
any legal issue superficially. A brief linguistic analysis will perhaps illuminate some latent
ambiguity and permit identification of the foundation for the ICTY's interpretation.
Initially, Art. 7(1) seems straightforward enough, beginning with lesser forms of
liability, and ascending by degree. If this is correct, then why place arguably the most culpable
action in furtherance of a criminal result, namely, commission, in such close proximity to what
is arguably the mode of participation least responsible, as mere encouragement or presence can
be enough to satisfy object elements of the crime? Not only are "committed" and "aided" in
close proximity to one another, but they are also separated by two words, “or otherwise,” that
almost always communicate equivalence of some kind.67 Applied to the language of Art. 7(1),
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Statute of the ICTY, at Art. 7, supra note 2 (reproduced here for convenience) [Electronic copy
provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source # 4].
67

Even where "or" is employed to present alternatives, the possibility of a comparison of this type is
grounded in the fact that in some fundamental way, the two are equivalent, can stand for each other, or
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this linguistic analysis is indicating that there are plenty of ways to list modes of individual
criminal responsibility that would leave no residue of equivalence. And yet, the drafters chose
to construct a clause that ascends sequentially from lowest degree to the highest degree of
culpability, and at the apex an odd comparative equivocation then initiates a second cycle of
terms arranged precisely like the first group. It seems possible that this clause represents one
line of thought dealing with the seemingly intractable fact that in the context of massive,
collective and systemic crimes: as the accused's proximity to the actual crime grows more
remote, his blameworthiness increases. In the context of mass, international crimes, there can
be no initial difference in the treatment of the principal and the accomplice. The implicit
message of the language in question is that guilt is guilt, a binary determinant, and any attempt
at "pre"-allocation is, perhaps, vanity.
What could possibly be the point of an extended analysis of the word "or" regarding a
form of liability that is, apparently, not even within the scope of this inquiry? The reason is, if

together produce redundancy. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY lists the following cryptic
definitions of "or" as used in its conjunctive, adverbial form: "Or connects two words that mean the
same thing: = otherwise called, that is (= L. vel. sive)," or finally, "After a primary statement, or appends
a secondary alternative, or consequence of setting aside the primary statement: = otherwise, else; in any
other case; if not." More often than not, when or is used to express alternatives, the purpose is not to
express mutual exclusivity the two objects of comparison but rather to express some limitation external
to them, such as time or space, that precludes there simultaneous application. Consider this: as two
objects conceptually become less alike, it also becomes less likely that there exists a logical basis for
comparison. People compare, for example, the Microsoft Windows operating system with that of Apple
Computers ad naseum, and precisely because functionally they perform the same tasks, conversely, one
never has and likely will not observe comparative analysis of a "grilled cheese sandwich" and* the
"planet Saturn" for the simple, yet counterintuitive fact that there is not enough correspondence between
the two for comparison’s meaningful occurrence. Furthermore, yet perhaps less obviously supportive of
the above assertion, is the fact that the word "or" is a homonym of "ore." Ore is raw stone of a certain
type that, while seemingly superfluous, is the necessary substrate from which a refined metal is derived.
Analogically, on might say that the separation of the two terms with the word "or" implies a derivative
relationship of some sort.
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the above supposition is accurate, then it is fair to conclude that commentators have yet to
scratch the surface of the import of a man who seems to have a special talent for identification
and "seizure of the Grotian Moment."68 More practical considerations are at work here, as it
may prove instructive if reservation is made for a brief discussion of the jurisprudence of the
STL's Presiding Judge and Judge Rapporteur. The first title typically indicates that any appeal
on which he adjudicates, the Judgment will likely be authored by his hand, while the second
title refers to the Judge charged with the responsibility of determining what preliminary
questions, if any, should be asked of the various participants of the tribunal. Additionally, any
judgments regarding preliminary questions of law are usually addressed in an opinion drafted
by the Judge Rapporteur, as was the case with the Interlocutory Decision. Given the titles held
by J. Cassese, the control they engender, his penchant for situating himself squarely within the
"Grotian Moment," and an adjudicative temperament, it just may be the case that insight into J.
Cassese's own legal philosophy and vision for the development of international criminal law is
more instructive than any comparative analysis of legal principles.
Returning to the discussion of the ICTY, the Tadic AC Judgment cites the Draft
Resolution from the Convention For the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. Considering the
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See Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the “Grotian Moment”: Accelerated Formation of Customary
International Law in Times of Fundamental Change, 43 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 439 (2010). This article
perfectly captures the process that J. Cassese has employed throughout a career in which he finds
himself perfectly situated to develop ICL concepts, doctrines and theories at an accelerated pace,
achieving decades of legal development in mere moments, relatively speaking. The Tadic decision
informed the world there is no international armed conflict requirement for individual criminal liability's
allocation., And equally as important, is the STL Appeals Chamber Interlocutory Decision that
acknowledges the crime of terrorism as existing within the body of customary international law.
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jurisdiction of the STL is premised exclusively on an act of terrorist bombing, it seems logical
that this Convention's draft resolution uses the exact same terms as the Statute for the STL:
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing
Article 2
Any person commits an offence […] if that person unlawfully […] detonates an
explosive […] against a place of public use […] [w]ith the intent to cause death or
serious bodily injury; or [w]ith the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a place,
facility or system, where such destruction results in or is likely to result in major
economic loss[, or …] [p]articipates as an accomplice in an offence, or [o]rganizes or
directs others to commit an offence, or [i]n any other way contributes to the
commission of one or more offences [...].69

The very fact the specific linguistic form at issue has been debated, discussed and codified at
least twice would seem to indicate general acceptance by the international community. Below
is an excerpt from a 2005 Convention where the draft resolution had undergone numerous
permutations, but the formulation of the modes of individual criminal responsibility remained
consistent. The time frame of events and the circumstantial evidence as to their acceptance,
beginning with the ICTY's declaration that JCE was now a customary norm, right up unto the
present where J. Cassese is essentially honored for his past jurisprudence; all implicitly support
the contention that something else is afoot at the STL. The path is being cleared for the
establishment of an international crime of terrorism. It is not without significance that the
international legal regime responded to those crying foul over the ICTY's application of JCE by
essentially writing it into the STLst.

69

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Res. 164, U.N. Doc.
A/52/49 (Dec. 15, 1997).
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International Convention For The Suppression Of The Financing Of Terrorism
Article 2
Any person also commits an offence if that person attempts to commit an
offence. A[] person also commits an offence if that person [p]articipates as an
accomplice in an offence; […] Organizes or directs others to commit an offence
[… or]; Contributes to the commission of one or more offences […] by a group
of persons acting with a common purpose […].
IV. The Differential Analysis
A.

Its Possibility: Simultaneous Multi-Variable Differential Determinations, or
Legal Calculus

Proof of the possibility of comparison is the logical first step towards a result that has
been carefully triangulated.

Comparison's possibility must be demonstrated before any

distinction can be made. The argument that follows will be two-fold in its application. The
issues presented by the Prosecutor's Chambers are at face value questions of simple
comparison. However, it soon becomes clear that the framework for comparison based on the
values of the input will result in a comparison of a known concept with a concept as yet
unidentified.

The context in which this thought first occurred to the author was during

contemplation of the legal difference between the decidedly Civil Law orientation of the
'perpetration by means' doctrine applied by the ICC and JCE as defined and applied by J.
Cassese.
Specifically Roman Canon law, German Law, and it now appears, the ICC has adopted
the doctrine of 'perpetration by means'. In two pre-trial decisions, the ICC patently rejected that
the language of Art. 25(1)(A) of its Statute intends to impose JCE. The language of the Statute
seems fairly clear in its intent, stating that whoever "[c]ommits such a crime, whether as an
individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other
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person is [themselves liable]" is individually criminally responsible. The determination of
criminal liability is always a multifaceted process of analysis in which the order of operations is
essential in producing the correct result. It appears to this author that the main, in fact only,
difference between 'perpetration by means' and 'joint criminal enterprise' can be found in the
order of operations implicit therein. Initially, it appears perhaps an egregious misallocation of
culpability to treat principles and accessories equally, and to attribute the same degree of guilt
to each.

Further, when JCE is contemplated there is the possibility that an individual

considered guilty under JCE III might not possess the intent required for the underlying
crime.70 The Civil Law approach appears to attempt an allocation of guilt simultaneously with
its determination. In the Anglo-American system, guilt does not seem to carry within it any
determination of degree.

The convicted is “guilty” or “not-guilty.”

A more nuanced

determination of factors extraneous to guilt is reserved for the sentencing stage, and rightly
so.71 For how is it possible to conduct simultaneous determinations, each containing multivariable factors, where the result of one depends upon the other? The approach of RomanGermanic-ICC jurisprudence seems to attempt simultaneous determinations of (1) whether

70

Here, the previously mentioned "holographic theory" of liability may be instructive. (This theory was
mentioned in passing above, as a way to understand the non-distinct treatment of principals and
accessories at the international tribunals following WW II; A war in which the leading Civil Law
nations [Germany & Italy] suffered battlefield repudiation.) The benefit of the holographic formulation
is that it provides a sound, logical quasi-materialistic framework for JCE doctrine. This theory is a
simple analogy: In the same way that a material of certain composition possesses the quality such that,
if broken, each piece can reproduce the whole, when a human group is specifically structured with an
aim towards criminality, each individual is imprinted with the entirety of the group's qualities, whatever
they may be.
71

Here, considerations such as mitigating and exacerbating circumstances play a role only after the
initial objective determination of guilt.
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there is guilt and (2) its degree and character. However, much like the discussion of objective
analysis above, the question becomes: How is it even possible to treat the issue of degree of
guilt without first, and most importantly, independently determining its existence?

What

initially appears as a Procrustean operation with regard to culpability can be seen in a new
context of the logical process of analysis. Guilt then is a binary determination in the AngloAmerican system. One either is, or is not guilty. Subsequent to that determination one might
then deal with the subjective determination of degree, which necessarily has some other label,
such as culpability. The question, "How guilty is he?" has dissonant quality to the American
ear. There is guilt, or there is not. This, it seem is a means of keeping the subjective and
objective separate for analytic purposes.
In the context of an analysis of the two groups of modes of individual criminal liability,
the fact that the modes found in the STLst. appear 'new' or different produces the same logical
quandary. How does one determine similarity in the absence of identification? Thankfully, J.
Cassese explicitly answers the question with the following:
Article 3 incorporates principles of international criminal law regarding various modes
of criminal liability, including commission, complicity, organising or directing others to
commit a crime, and contribution to the commission of crimes by a multitude of
persons or an organised group. The language of Article 3 draws verbatim from the
Statutes of the ICC, the ICTY, the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, and the
more recent international conventions against terrorism; it reflects the status of
customary international law as articulated in the case law of the ad hoc tribunals. It thus
implicitly incorporates into the Tribunal's Statute the body of international law setting
out and applying these principles of individual criminal responsibility.

A statement from the Tribunal's legal authority that categorically and unambiguously answers
the question posed.

"Participating as an accomplice" means "aiding and abetting."

"Organizing" means "planning," and "directed others to commit" contains the modes
"instigating" and "ordering" within its concept. Now, the question emerges, what purpose
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might this replacement of the familiar terminology of international criminal responsibility with
these terms serve?
An analysis of the terms proffered as examples of 'known' modes of international
criminal responsibility as they relate to the Lebanese Criminal Code (LCC) is necessary. The
first is "aiding and abetting." Within the applicable sections of the Lebanese Criminal Code,
the use of the concept "aiding and abetting" is found only once, and its occurrence exists
merely to help define, in Lebanese law, the accomplice. Second, the term "planning" does not
exist within the relevant sections of the LCC. The "instigator" is thorough treated in the LCC.
The major difference between instigation in international criminal law and LCC is that under
Lebanese law it is an inchoate offense. Finally, in each of over forty occurrences of the term
"order," or any of its cognates, it is used in the context of judicial power. For example, "a
prohibition order was imposed," "the judgment ordering," and "may be ordered [by the court],"
et cetera. The point here is that within the Lebanese Criminal Code "ordering" has no criminal
connotation whatsoever. Now this memo will attempt to show how the facts raised above
indicate purpose in the abandonment of this language by the STLst.
Beginning at the end, "ordering," through its standard use in the LCC becomes a
patently unreasonable label to describe those aspects contained within the concept as used in
ICL. As made clear in the Interlocutory Decision, the STL is charged with the application of
Lebanese law, and one would think that this means, to the extent possible, all of the terms and
concepts that flow therefrom. The STLst. becomes its own best example as to how one might
proceed given the seemingly inherent contradiction of Articles 2 and 3.

The Statute

deferentially augments the expression of international legal principles to accommodate the
particular aspects of Lebanese law that are in superficial conflict with those principles. To
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utilize "ordering" in a Tribunal that applies Lebanese law, partially comprised of Lebanese
jurists, and that will likely be followed closely by the Lebanese people, would constitute a
monumental act of legal tone deafness. It would be not only callous in its disregard for the
dictates of its own Statute but would also be insulting to the Lebanese people, perhaps
damaging the esteem of the STL, specifically, and international criminal law, generally. This
may be overstated, and it is probably true that for the most part an awareness of such an issue
would not rise to a conscious level, but a subterranean discomfort could have serious
implications for a situation already tenuous.
Discussion of the terms "planning" and "aiding and abetting" is consolidated, as the
rationale applicable to each is the same. With the exception of the brief identification of the
aider and abettor as a type of accomplice, these terms are not found in the Lebanese Criminal
Code.

By the Statute's reference, in Article 3, to terms that are both synonymous with

customary modes of international criminal responsibility and familiar to Lebanese law, two
essential functions result. First, the deference to Lebanese law required by the STLst. is not
only referenced, but also codified. In what might be referred to as an antinomy of international
law, its authority increases in correlation with increased deference to domestic legal regimes.
As the project of constructing a viable framework for an international legal system, both
respected and effective, advances, the theories and principles it applies must be broad enough
in conception to contain the range of reasonable legal understanding as embodied throughout
the world. Yet, at the same time, authority is necessary for this project's success. Perhaps the
most difficult issue facing international criminal law is the development of a system capable
not only of dealing with Tadic, the criminal who by his usurpation of the governmental
authority seeks to evade individual criminal responsibility by invoking the domestic nature of
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his crimes, but also, this system must ultimately be capable of dealing with those who would
seek to evade liability through their affiliation in trans-national, or rather non-national groups.
The obvious example of the latter is a terrorist organization that claims no national affiliation
and, even further, has essentially declared war on notions of political organization grounded in
secular law. There is probably no immediate, obvious solution, but one way to approach the
issue with a chance for success is to scan the horizon for the "Grotian Moments" and conduct
the business of international law in a manner that expresses the highest level of deference to
domestic concerns, even when and if it is merely chimerical.

Applied to the STLst.,

immeasurably more respect and authority is gained by utilizing the terminology of the LCC
with the awareness that there is largely no difference between the two in the results achieved.
The effect of this approach is to put the world on notice that the modes of international criminal
responsibility can be understood not only in the way customarily formulated, but also as having
incorporated all language that means generally the same thing. This last point is essential in a
legal system that places great emphasis on legality, embodied by nullum crimen sine lege.
With estimates of the number of languages spoken globally anywhere from 3,000 to 10,000,
this linguistic transposition of terms is not merely academic.

Unless natural law is the

foundational theory of international criminal law, the continuation of this process of lexical
dissemination is essential for the preservation of the principle of legality.
In one instance the above solution was unavailable. Use of the word "instigate" would
have resulted in international law's usurpation of its definition and application to any defendant
so charged. Because Lebanese law is the starting point for analysis, and there is a conflict
between the conceptions of instigation, international law would apply. What then is the harm
in utilizing terms that ad initio indicate what standards will and will not apply. In its current
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form the STLst. indicates to those with a legal understanding that the Lebanese attribution of
guilt for instigation to inchoate crimes will not survive the layer of legal analysis represented
by Article 3. This seems a more deferential treatment of domestic concerns, just as required by
the STL Statute.
B.

Summation and Conclusion

As indicated by the discussion above, the subject of individual criminal responsibility is
not straight forward. There are competing theories, interests and sensibilities beneath the
surface of most the of the key issues involved. However, given the legal temperament of the
STL's presiding judge and his focus on legality, it seems highly unlikely that "new modes" of
individual criminal responsibility will be read into the statutory language at issue in this memo.
Any substantive differences between the jurisprudence of the STL and the other ad hoc
tribunals (including the ICC, although it is certainly not an ad hoc tribunal) will likely present
themselves as new ways of applying the customary modes of criminal responsibility. Perhaps
"planning/organizing" will be applied to the newly recognized international crime of terrorism.
Regardless, there seems to be little evidence to support the notion that a change in terminology
with regard to liability indicates any substantive legal difference.
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